Family Business in Peru: Survival and Expansion under the Liberalization by Shimizu Tatsuya
Family Business in Peru: Survival and
Expansion under the Liberalization
著者 Shimizu Tatsuya
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 7
year 2004-08-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/197
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
? ? ? ? ?  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It is argued th
managerial firm
would have ma
would be sepa
businesses, in 
important role 
started in Peru 
the increase in
indispensable f
human and tec
without losing 
have incorpora
secure the con
keeping exclusi
with other famDISCUSSION PAPER No. 7 
 
Family Business in Peru: Survival
and Expansion under the 
Liberalization 
 
Tatsuya SHIMIZU* at joint stock companies would be transformed from family firms to 
s with their development in size and scope.  Such managerial firms 
ny small shareholders; hence the ownership and management of the firm 
rated.  However, in many developing countries including Peru, family 
which families control both ownership and management, still play an 
in the national economy.  After the liberalization of economy, which 
in the 1990s, the national market has become more competitive due to 
 participation of foreign capitals.  To secure competitiveness, it is 
or family businesses to obtain management resources such as financial, 
hnological resources from outside of the families.  In order to do so 
the control over ownership and management, Peruvian family businesses 
ted companies with distinct characteristics to the extent that they can 
trol over ownership and management inside of their group.  While 
ve control of companies in traditional sectors, they actively seek alliance 
ilies and foreign capitals in competitive sectors.  The management of 
1
companies with different degrees of control allows them to survive in today’s rapidly 
changing business environment. 
 
 
Keywords: family business, joint stock companies, ownership, management, Peru 
JEL classification: M19, O54 
  
* Staff Researcher, Latin American Studies Group, Area Studies Center, IDE 
(tats@ide.go.jp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semi-governmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.??
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, Middle 
East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and East Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed. 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2004 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
2
Introduction 
 
Peru has been depending in primary exports such as mining and agricultural 
products in its history.  Although foreign companies had been dominant in their 
exports until the first half of the 20th century, some Peruvian companies that exist today 
started their business at the turn of the century and became to compete with foreign 
companies.  Most of these companies can be called family businesses, in which 
founding families exclusively control ownership and management of their companies. 
The participation of foreign capitals in the Peruvian economy was greatly 
changed by the military government established by General Velasco at the end of 1960s.  
The government attempted to control economic activities by establishing state-owned 
enterprises, and aimed at industrialization by substituting imports.  At the same time, 
the government limited the participation of foreign capitals in economic activities and 
favored national capitals, or local family businesses.  For example, foreign capitals 
were forced to decrease their participation in banking activities, and some decided to 
withdraw from the country selling stocks to local family businesses.  The family 
businesses took advantage of this situation and expanded their activities from their 
traditional business such as agriculture and commerce to new areas like manufacturing.  
Despite of adverse economic environment in the 1980s, these family businesses 
expanded their scale and scope within the protected national economy. 
 The economic liberalization reform in the 1990s changed this panorama.  The 
government started to privatize major public enterprises in banking, petroleum, 
electricity, telecommunication sectors, etc.  It also eliminated foreign exchange control, 
reduced and simplified tariffs.  Not only transnational companies in Europe and North 
America participated in the privatized sectors, but also major corporations in Latin 
American region made inroads into Peruvian markets in food and consumer goods 
sectors. 
 Since the economic liberalization, Peruvian family businesses have been 
loosing their territories by the expansion of foreign capitals.  In 1999, Banco Wiese, 
one of the major banks established by national capital, was sold to an Italian financial 
group.  In 2002, beer company Backus, which absorbed all national breweries and 
enjoyed monopoly in the national market, was acquired by Colombian company that 
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aims to integrate the regional market. 
 However, there are some Peruvian family businesses that took advantage of the 
liberalization and strengthened their businesses.  One of the best examples is Romero 
Group, the largest family business group in today’s Peru.  Banco de Crédito, largest 
bank in the country and the flagship company of the group, has been expanding its 
territory to Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador.  In 2003, it purchased a retail section of a 
Spanish bank in Peru.  Also, the group absorbed a foreign and a national company for 
its food business, and founded the largest food and consumer goods manufacturer 
Alicorp in 1996. 
 This paper intends to analyze the evolution of Peruvian family businesses after 
the liberalization by focusing on the control of ownership and management by families.  
The first section briefly presents arguments on the evolution of family businesses.  It 
also mentions existing studies on Peruvian family business.  The second section 
explains the change of business environment in the economic liberalization process after 
1990.  The company sales ranking is used to verify the change in the presence of 
public, foreign and family business companies.  The third section presents three cases 
of Peruvian family businesses explaining their control of ownership and management.  
The fourth section concludes how Peruvian family businesses experience their evolution 
in order to maintain and expand in a liberalized economy. 
 
1. Evolution of Family Business 
 
 According to A.D. Chandler1, with the growth of a joint stock company in its 
size, original share holders, such as family members and small number of investors, 
cannot secure the entire share.  Through sales of shares in a stock exchange, a large 
number of small share holders emerge.  These small share holders are only interested 
in stock price and dividend, while the management of company is transferred from a 
founding family to professional salaried managers.  This often occurs in a family 
business because a family has limits in its financial and human resources.  With a 
family business expanding its scopes to industries which require larger capital, such as 
manufacturing, the family needs to obtain the capital from outside.  Also, in order to 
                                                  
1 Chandler (1995), Morikawa (1996) p.12. 
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invest in an industry in which family members do not have knowledge and experience, 
it is necessary to hire professional managers who are educated and experienced in the 
area.  This process of separating ownership and management, along with the 
development of managerial hierarchy, or the transformation from family firms to 
managerial firms, is a common phenomenon among large companies in the United 
States.   
 However, the separation of ownership and management is not a common 
phenomenon around the world according to the study by La Porta and others2.  They 
made a research on the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 developed 
countries, and found out that except in economies with very good shareholder protection, 
such as in the United States, U.K. and other a few countries, the ownership of 
corporation is not widely spread, and these firms are controlled by families or the state.  
In fact, in many developing countries, besides enterprises established by states or 
foreign capitals, most of large corporations founded by national capitalists are family 
owned.  And the owner families control management of these corporation. 
 The liberalization and globalization of economy forced family businesses to 
change in order to adapt to a new economic environment.  While some family 
businesses have survived, many others have disappeared.  Hoshino presents two 
perspectives about the changes of family businesses3.  The one perspective is a decline 
of family business.  She argues that family businesses are declining because of the 
changes of business environment.  Some of the important factors that supported the 
development of family business are stable economic growth and protection of national 
economy by the state.  These two factors have been reduced or disappeared in the 
process of the structural adjustment and liberalization, which many Latin American 
countries implemented after the debt crisis in the early 1980s.  In case of Asia, the 
economic crisis in the second half of the 1990s interrupted a stable economic growth, 
and the protection of national economy was removed.  In addition, with the expansion 
of a family business in its size and scope, it faces its limit of management resources 
within a family, namely financial, human and technical resources.  The family needs to 
depend more on resources from outside.  Because of the changes of business 
                                                  
2 La Poarta, et. al. (1999). 
3 Hosino ed. (2004). 
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environment and the limit of management resources inside a family, a family business is 
declining. 
 The other perspective is the evolution of family business.  Some family 
businesses are not only surviving, but also expanding.  Also, new family businesses 
are emerging after the liberalization of economy.  Furthermore, some family 
businesses in developing countries have made themselves into multinational enterprises 
and have started to make investment in other countries in the region.  These family 
businesses have overcome their limits in management resources inside the family, and 
adapted themselves to new business environment.  The question is if these family 
firms are going to become managerial firms in which ownership and management are 
separated with developed managerial hierarchy as Chandler discusses. 
 With respect to the existing studies on Peruvian family business, it is worth to 
mention the works by Carlos Malpica.  He published a series of books called Los 
Dueños del Perú (The Owners of Peru) during 1960s and 70s which listed principle 
properties of major families in Peru.  The list included general information of farms, 
mines, industrial companies that belonged to each family.  In 1989, he also published 
El Poder Económico en el Perú (Economic Power in Peru).  This two-volume title 
contains information about families that formed banking and other business groups in 
Peru.  Malpica mentions a brief history of major families and their control over 
ownership and management of the companies.  Eduardo Anaya published a book 
called Grupos de Poder Económico (Group of Economic Power), in which he described 
control by families over five major banking groups in Peru. 
 A series of studies by Enrique Vásquez focus on development process of family 
business groups in Peru.  In his book, Grupos Económicos en el Perú (Economic 
Group in Peru), he selected four major family business groups, namely Romero, Brescia, 
Wiese and Bentín, and examined their evolution from their foundation in the late 19th 
century until 1990s.  Francisco Durand is also involved in the similar studies with 
focus on today’s family business groups.  In his article “Backus y la desaparición de 
los apóstoles” (Backus and disappearance of the Apostles), he chose 12 family business 
groups that pledged their cooperation to Garcia’s government in the late 1980s, plus 
some other new family business groups.  Having examined the current situation of 
each group, he concluded that among 18 groups, 9 groups are stable while 6 groups are 
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weakening and 3 groups have disappeared.  He argued that those disappeared or 
weakened could not adapt new business environments. 
 Based on these existing studies, this study analyzes today’s family business in 
Peru, utilizing information on companies that are available through public and private 
institutions. 
 
2. Economic Reforms and Changes in the 1990s 
 
2-1. Economic Reforms 
 The Fujimori government, which took power in July 1990, implemented 
economic reforms based on market liberalization.  Liberalization consists of policies 
such as privatization of public enterprises, simplification and reduction of tariff, 
deregulation of foreign exchange regime, etc.  Revisions of laws and regulations for 
banking, capital market, corporations are especially relevant for changes in business 
environment in Peru.  In banking law, Superintendent of Banks and Insurances 
(Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros: SBS) is established to monitor the financial 
sector.  It obliged financial institutions to disclose information.  State banks for 
agriculture, industry, mining and housing were closed down, and state-owned 
commercial banks were privatized.   
 In the capital market, the reforms were aimed at to reactivate capital market to 
help corporations to raise capital and to provide investors with variety of financial 
products.  The National Council of Enterprises and Stocks (Consejo Nacional de 
Empresas y Valores: CONASEV) played a major role as a supervisor of the capital 
market.  A private pension fund system was introduced, and the administrators of the 
fund called AFP (Administradores de Fopdos de Pensiones) became important 
institutional investors in the capital market.  As a result, transaction in Lima Stock 
Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Lima: BVL) increased from US$ 764 million in 1990 to 
US$ 12,131 million in 19974.  In 2004, around 200 corporations are listed in BVL.  
 Corporate laws (Ley de Sociedades Generales) were revised in 1997.  The 
new corporate laws divide joint-stock companies into two forms: private or closed 
(Sociedad Anónima Cerrada: S.A.C.) and public or open (Sociedad Anónima Abierta: 
                                                  
4 Morris and Muñoz [2000:440]. 
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S.A.A.).  Through the reform, foundation of private corporations became easier than 
before because the number of minimum directors was reduced from three to two, and 
the installation of board of directors and external auditing became optional.  In case of 
public corporations, the law obliges to have directors that represent minority 
shareholders, to receive external auditing and to register corporate and financial 
information to CONASEV. 
 
2-2. Privatization and Foreign Investment 
 In order to examine how these changes of business environment in the 1990s 
affected family business in Peru, the top 100 sales ranking of corporations in Peru 
prepared by Peru Top Publications is used5.  The author classified top 100 companies 
into four categories: state owned, foreign capital, family-owned and other.  Numbers of 
companies in each categories and their sales share among 100 companies are 
summarized in Table 1.  The table also includes figures for top 50 companies in order 
to increase accuracy in classification.  
 Table 1 shows three tendencies.  The first is the replacement of state 
enterprises by foreign capitals.  From 1987 to 2001, the number of state enterprises 
decreased from 28 to 12, while that of foreign capitals increased from 25 to 41.  This is 
because foreign capitals actively participated in privatization of large state enterprises in 
petroleum, communication and mining sectors.  In terms of sales shares, state 
enterprises represented 50% while foreign capitals represented 20% in 1987.  The 
foreign capitals caught up with the state enterprises in 1994, and reversed in 2001.  
The second is the slight decline of family businesses.  Although the number of family 
owned firms increased from 43 in 1987 to 46 in 1994, it decreased to 30 in 2001.  The 
same tendency can be confirmed with the changes in the top 50 companies.  After the 
initial declined of economy because of the shock brought by the abrupt liberalization at 
the beginning of 1990s, the economy recovered in a few years.  Family businesses 
started to grow through this recuperation.  Some of them participated in the 
privatization and listed in the top 100.  However, the recession that started in 1998 
eliminated them from the list.  The third is the concentration of foreign capitals into 
                                                  
5 The ranking include both public and private companies, but excludes financial 
corporations (banks, insurance, pension funds, etc.) 
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higher ranks.  Comparing the top 100 and the top 50 companies, the presence of 
foreign capitals are stronger in the top 50 companies. 
 Considering the result of this analysis, it is confirmed that foreign capitals have 
increased their presence through privatization of state enterprises, and Peruvian family 
business is facing very competitive market environment. 
 
2-3. Major Economic Groups 
 In order to closely examine the competition between foreign capitals and 
Peruvian family businesses, Table 2 listed 51 economic groups identified by Peru Top 
Publications in 2001.  Among these, the author classified 19 groups as that of foreign 
capitals, 31 as family business and 1 as other. 
 This table shows that the presence of foreign capitals is very strong in 
petroleum, telecommunications and banking industries.  These are the industries that 
demand huge capital and latest technologies.  Spanish companies such as Repsol in 
petroleum, Telefónica in telecommunications and Banco Bilibao Vizcaya in banking, 
which had participated in privatization process in Latin American region, made inroads 
upon Peruvian market.  Meanwhile, Peruvian family business companies maintain 
their presence in construction, cement, agriculture, real estates and textile industries.  
These are the ones from which families started their business.  Compared with 
petroleum, telecommunication and banking industries, the sizes of capital required in 
these industries are very small.    In the industries such as mining, commerce and 
beverage, food and toiletry, foreign capitals and family business are competing.  In 
mining industry, large corporations such as Southern Peru Copper Corporation and 
Minera Yanacocha6 are foreign capitals while small and medium sized mines are 
controlled by family business.  In commerce, modern retail store chains such as Saga 
Falabella and Reipley are dominated by foreign capitals while in supermarket, which 
needs numerous local suppliers, family business such as Wong is competitive.  In 
beverage, food and toiletry industry, Peruvian family businesses such as Alicorp, 
Backus, Lindley (Inca Kola) are competing fiercely with international brands such as 
Coca Cola, P&G, Uniliver. 
                                                  
6 U.S. company Newmont holds 51.35% of shares while Peruvian company 
Buenaventura holds 43.6%. 
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 3. Cases from Three Family Businesses in Peru 
 
This section attempts to analyze how family businesses in Peru have been 
trying to survive in the competitive business environment since the 1990s by closely 
examining their control of ownership and management of three representative family 
businesses in Peru, namely Romero, Brescia and Backus (Bentín family).  Romero 
group consists of Banco de Crédito, the largest commercial bank in the country, and 
Alicorp, the largest industrial company in private sector by national capital.  Brescia 
group owns a half of Banco Continental, one of the four major commercial banks in the 
country, and Minsur, one of the largest tin producers in the world.  It used to own 
Tejido La Unión, the biggest textile industrial group in the country at the end of the 
1980s.  Bentín family had been a major shareholder of Cervecería Backus & Johnston 
(Backus), the leading brewery in the country.  Since the second half of the 1990s, 
Backus absorbed its competitors and established a monopoly.  However, a Colombian 
brewery Bavaria acquired majority of its share in 2002.  In this paper, Backus is treated 
as Bentín’s family business prior to its acquisition by Bavaria.  In the following 
sections, brief history of each family is overviewed followed by analysis of control over 
ownership and management. 
 
3-1. Romero Group: The Biggest Family Business in Peru 
 
3-1-1. Brief History 
 The origin of Romero’s family business came from the foundation of C. 
Romero & Co. by Calixto Santo Romero, a Spanish immigrant, in the 1880s.  The 
company was based in Piura, northern coastal department of Peru.  It was involved in 
export of panama hats, which were typical handicrafts of the area.  There was strong 
demand for panama hats in the international market, and Calixto accumulated capital 
through this business and invested into cotton ginning factories.  In order to compete 
with other ginning factories for raw material, Calixto began helping farmers finance 
their cultivation, then bought cotton farms and launched to cultivate cotton in order to 
supply his ginning factories.  He also invested in Banco Italiano in 1918.  In 1920s, 
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he expanded his business to cotton oil production, and the company became familiar in 
the region.  According to Vásquez (2000 p.114), the company started to appoint 
professional mangers and agronomists who played important roles for introduction of 
new Pima variety of cotton in the region.  At the same time, Calixto helped his relative, 
Feliciano del Campo Romero, to study economics and finance in England.  Feliciano 
succeeded Calixto’s business after his death in 19357.   
 It was Feliciano who pushed Romero’s family business to a nationwide 
business group through diversifying its business into the financial sector.  In 1951, 
Feliciano participated in a foundation of Banco Continental, and invested in an 
insurance company El Pacífico Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros.  Furthermore, he 
established a trading company, Calixto Mostert, a joint venture with a foreign capital.  
C. Romero & Co. is divided into a few specialized companies such as: Almacenes 
Romero S.A. (import of agricultural input and sales of oil based products), Romero S.A. 
(finance cotton cultivation and ginning), Romero & Co. Agents (trade agent).  It also 
invested in brewery Backus through the Lima stock exchange. 
 During the military government of Velasco in the late 1960s and the early 
1970s, industrialization through import substitution policy gave preference to national 
capitalists over foreign capitalists.  This policy helped Dionisio Romero Seminario, the 
third generation of the family, expand his family business.  Dionisio, who was 
appointed as a director of the state Industrial Bank, took advantage of his position and 
received loans to establish a textile company in Piura.  Furthermore, Romero group 
bought ginning and vegetable oil plants from Anderson Clayton, which decided to 
withdraw from Peru because of unfavorable business environment for foreign capitals.  
Through this acquisition, Romero obtained not only large scale production base but also 
a new management system of Anderson Clayton.  In a financial sector, the military 
government imposed a restriction on participation of foreign capitals.  They are 
allowed to own only up to 20% of stocks of banks in the country.  Romero family, 
together with other minority shareholding families of Banco de Crédito (ex Banco 
Italiano) such as Brescia, Raffo, Nicolini, increased their participation in the bank by 
purchasing stocks released by Banque Sudameris.  In 1979, these Peruvian families 
                                                  
7 According to Malpica (1989 p.83), Calixto’s children, Dionisio and Francisca Romero 
Iturrospe were inconspicuous behind Feliciano.  
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took over the control of the bank, and Dionisio became the president of the board. 
 By the 1980s, Romero group became one of the biggest family businesses in 
the country.  Although it faced a crisis of nationalization of Banco de Crédito in the 
late 1980s, Romero managed to get away with the nationalization by selling its stocks to 
the employees, and transfer some of its assets to its subsidiaries established outside of 
the country.  After the liberalization of economy at the beginning of the 1990s, Romero 
recovered the control of Banco de Crédito.  The bank expanded not only in the country, 
but also in the Andean region through acquiring banks in Bolivia, Colombia and 
Ecuador.  In textile sector, a group’s spinning company expanded its export by 
introducing foreign technology and building a new factory together with a foreign 
capital.  In consumer goods (food and toiletry products) sector, Romero purchased La 
Fabril, one of the biggest companies in the sector by foreign capital of Bunge y Born, 
then absorbed Nicolini Hermanos, the biggest flour milling company, and established 
Alicorp. 
 
3-1-2. Control over Ownership and Management 
 Based on the ownership and management structure, companies of Romero 
group can be classified into three sub-groups (Chart 2-1, 2-2).  The first one is a 
financial sub-group (Credicorp group).  Although Romero famlily does not own 
majority shares of Credicorp, holding company of Banco de Crédito, companies in this 
sub-group are considered to belong to Romero group.  The second sub-group includes 
Alicorp and its related companies (Alicorp group).  Romero family seems to own 
majority of these companies, but there are also other important share holders.  The 
third sub-group is companies in commerce and agriculture sector (Ransa group).  The 
companies in this sub-group are exclusively owned and controlled by the family8. 
 With respect to Credicorp group, although Romero family can have a strong 
influence over the companies as the largest shareholder, the family alone does not have 
total control over its ownership and management.  The family owns 15% of shares 
issued by Credicorp while the rest are owned by pension funds and other families.   In 
insurance sector, Credicorp owns 76% of Pacífico Peruano Suiza while an U.S. 
                                                  
8 CONASEV and Peru Top Publications divide Romero’s family business into two 
groups: Credicorp group and Romero group. 
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insurance company A.I.U. owns 20% and other Peruvian families also have some shares.  
This ownership structure is reflected to the composition of board members (Table 3).  
Dionisio Romero Seminario, the leader of the third generation of Romero family, is the 
president of board in many group companies in Credicorp group accompanied by some 
of the family members as board members.  Besides Romero family, representatives 
from minor shareholding families such as Nicolini, Verme, Llosa, Raffo are included in 
the board member.  The insurance companies have different board members from 
different minority shareholding families and representatives from A.I.U.  As to 
management teams 9 , family representatives do not serve as managers and leave 
day-to-day management to professional managers headed by Raymundo Morares.  He 
and other mangers such as Carlos Muños (assistant general manager), José Luis 
Gagliardi (manager in administration) have been in an important position in foreign 
banks, and the first two acquired MBA degree from Wharton School. 
 With respect to Alicorp group, it is difficult to determine how much stocks the 
family holds.  However, judging from the fact that the important part of Alicorp is 
composed of Romero’s family companies, such as Consorcio Distribuidora and Cía 
Industrial Perú Pacífico, Romero family is likely to still own majority.  At present, U.S. 
grain giant, Cargil, and pension funds own some part of its shares (Table 2-2).  The 
president of the board is Dionisio Romero Paoletti, the son of Dionisio Romero 
Seminario and the leader of the fourth generation of the family.  His cousin, Ernesto 
Romero Belismelis stays in the position of vice president.  According to the Peru Top 
Publications, the fact that Dionisio Romero Seminario transferred the presidency of 
Alicorp and Ransa groups to his son is to disperse the risk of the family and to increase 
transparency of group companies10.  Also, the management team of Alicorp includes 
some family members.  This can be interpreted as a training for young family members.  
In case of textile companies in Alicorp group, representatives from other participating 
families serve as board members.  In addition, some family members serve as 
managers in these companies.  In this sub-group, both ownership and management are 
mostly controlled by the family.  
                                                  
9 Management teams consist of managers listed in CONASEV’s corporate information 
as “Plana Gerencial,” which includes general manager (gerente general) and other 
managers. 
10 The Peru Top Publications (2003) p.846. 
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 Finally, Ransa group consists of companies such as Ransa Comercial (logistics), 
Romero Trading (export of agricultural products), Palma de Espino and Industria de 
Espino (cultivation of palm trees and production of palm oil), etc.  As Table 2-2 shows, 
Romero family owns 100% of these companies, and dominates the board lead by 
Dionisio Romero Paoletti.?  
 
3-2. Brescia Group: Recover from a Failure in Textile 
 
3-2-1. Brief History 
 Brescia is the second largest family business group in the country at the 
moment.  After working for a retail store owned by an Italian, an Italian immigrant 
Fortunato Brescia (Chart 3) purchased small farms and started to produce wheat and 
dairy products in order to supply retail stores in Lima.  With capital accumulated 
through this business, he bought larger farms close to Lima to increase agricultural 
production for urban consumers.  When the city started to expand in the 1930s, his 
farm land became an objective of urbanization and its value rapidly increased.  In the 
1940s, Prado government expropriated a part of Brescia’s farm in Limatambo, a suburb 
of Lima, in order to construct an airport.  Although it was a loss in a short term, the 
increase of land value around the airport that was owned by Brescia benefited the 
family in a long term.  Fortunato established a real estate developer company, 
Urbanizadora Jardín, and real estate became a core business of the family. 
 After the decease of Fortunato, his sons, Pedro and Mario Bresica Cafferata 
took over the family business developed by their father.  Brescia brothers invested 
profit earned by the real estate sector into fishery and mining sector, which went 
through a boom at that time.  At the end of the 1950s, when fish meal boomed because 
of the increase of demand as livestock feed, they established a fish meal factory outside 
of Lima, which became one of the five largest producers in the country.  When the 
mining boom occurred in the 1970s because of high metal price in the international 
market, the family invested in the redevelopment of mines owned by the family.  
However, both booms did not last so long.   
 Although the family experienced a great loss because of expropriation of its 
farmland and fish meal factory by the Velasco government, Brescia brothers diversified 
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their business activities taking advantage of withdrawal of foreign capitals.  While 
increasing participation in Banco de Crédito along with Romero and other Peruvian 
families, Brescia increased its participation in insurance companies, Compañía de 
Seguros Rímac and Compañía Internacional de Seguros del Perú.  At the same time, 
the family bought mines owned by an U.S. company W.R. Grace (Cía Minera Atacocha 
and Minsur) and a textile company formally owned by a British Duncan Fox (Fábrica 
de Tejidos la Unión).  By the end of the 1970s, Brescia’s family business had grown to 
include real estate, banking, insurance, textile, chemical, mining, etc.  Especially, 
Fábrica de Tejidos la Unión, with the acquisition of supermarket chains, became a 
largest conglomerate in Peru’s industrial sector in the 1980s. Although Brescia brothers 
stayed in positions of the president and the vice-president of the textile company, they 
left its management to professional managers who had been involved in managing it 
since before.  When the company went into trouble by guaranteeing debts by other 
Brescia group companies, the brothers were forces to leave from the board.  In the 
1990s, when the liberalization of market allowed cheap import of textile, the company 
faced with competition against the imported.  Brescia brothers decided to sell the 
company to its former executives, and lost the conglomerate.   
 In the 1990s, Brescia sought a new expansion.  It participated in a 
privatization of Banco Continental together with Spanish bank Banco Bilbao Viscaya (it 
is now Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria: BBVA).  While Brescia holds 50% of its 
stocks and the position of president of the board, the management of the bank is 
controlled by BBVA.   Furthermore, Brescia made a large investment in Minsur and 
built a foundry, which generated big profit for the family and made Minsur one of the 
largest tin producers in the world.  Furthermore, the family invested in tourism 
industry, owning and running a chain of five-star hotels in major cities in the country. 
 
3-2-2. Control over Ownership and Management 
 Based on the ownership and management structure, companies of Brescia 
group can be divided into three sub-groups (Chart 4).  The first sub-group includes 
Banco Continental and other financial companies (financial group).  The second 
sub-group is holding companies of Brescia family such as Inversiones Breca (family 
holdings group).  The third sub-group includes other companies for mining, tourism, 
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insurance, etc (industrial group). 
 In the financial group, Brescia and BBVA each has 50% of Holding 
Continental, which owns most of Banco Continental and little more than half of a 
pension fund AFP Horizonte.  BBVA directly invests in AFP Horizonte together with 
other Spanish and Chilean capitals.  The list of board members in Table 4 shows that 
Brescia brothers are the president and the vice-president of the board along with other 
younger family members as directors.  Some representatives from BBVA are also on 
the board.  With respect to the management, the team consists of highly educated and 
experienced professional managers.  José Antonio Colomer, board member and general 
manager, acquired MBA from a Spanish university and had served in BBVA’s affiliates 
in Latin America before joining Banco Continental.  The assistant general manager, 
Jose Luis Casabonne Rickets, is ex-general manager of a pension fund, and the financial 
manager, Enrique Pellejero Collado, was ex-substitute director of a pension fund.  The 
managers of AFP Horizonte consist of those who acquired business degrees, and board 
members of financial subsidiaries include ex-managers of the bank.  Taking these facts 
in consideration, it can be argued that the financial companies are run by non-family 
professional managers. 
 The second sub-group, family holding group, includes investment (holding) 
and real estate development companies.  Four brothers and sisters of Brescia Caferrata 
personally own shares of these companies, and family members are directors and 
managers.  These are typical family business companies in which family controls 
exclusively its ownership and management. 
 Finally, the rest of Brescia group companies can be classified as the business 
group, in which Brescia family controls majority shares, but other families participate in 
the board as minority share holders.  In this sub-group, directors and managers are 
distinctly different.  For example, the managing team of a chemical company EXSA is 
composed of specialists in economics, chemistry and metal engineering.  It is likely 
that Brescia family leaves most part of operation to these professional managers. 
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3-3. Backus Group: Integration of Beer Industry and Acquisition by Foreign 
Capital 
 
3-3-1. Brief History11
 Today, Peru’s brewing industry is monopolized by Unión de Cervecerías 
Peruanas Backus y Johnston (Peruvian Brewery Union Backus and Johnston: UCPBJ).  
The brewery, Cervecería Backus & Johnston (Backus), was founded by two Americans, 
Jacob Backus and Howard Johnston, at the end of 19th century just outside of Lima city.  
The relationship between Backus and Bentín family started when Ricardo Bentín 
Sanchez purchased some shares of B&J at the end of 1910s.  Bentín was already an 
eminent family in Peru at that time.  Antonio Bentín y La Fuente, father of Ricardo 
Bentín, was the prime minister, and Ricardo Bentín himself was the vice-chairperson of 
the congress.  His wife, Rosa Mujica Carassa was also from an eminent family of 
Mujica.  Her father Elías Mujica y Trasmonete was a director of Companía Nacional 
de Cerveza (CNC), a competitor of Backus, and his brother Carlos Mujica Carassa was 
the president of CNC (Chart 5). 
 When B&J was transferred from English management to Peruvian in the 1950s, 
Ricardo Bentín Mujica, son of Ricardo Bentín Sanchez, became the vice president of 
the company.  Later he became the president and controlled its management in 
cooperation with other share holding families such as Olaechea and Berckemeyer.  
Meanwhile, Piaggio family, which owned CNC but has left the management to Mujica 
family since the turn of the century, regained the control of the company in the 1950s.  
Although Backus and CNC were competitors, they held shares each other, and jointly 
established Maltería Lima, which supplied malt for both breweries.  Under the Velasco 
government, both companies expanded taking advantage of government policy to 
promote national industries.  They established oligopoly in beer market: Lima market 
for Backus and regional market for CNC. 
 After the decease of Ricardo Bentín Sanchez in 1979, some of the family 
members sold Backus shares to other families such as Romero, Raffo and Brescia.  All 
of them were directors of Banco de Crédito.  Consequently the control of ownership of 
                                                  
11 Malpica (1974), Vásquez (2000), Durand (2000), and CONASEV, information of this 
section is based on Sanchez (1978). 
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Bentín family were weakened.  As of 1984, Bentín had 14% of Backus shares while 
Brescia, Romero and Raffo families had 19% in total, Backus and its subsidiaries had 
11%, and Olaechea and Berckmeyer had 5%.  Bentín prevented a take over by Brescia, 
Romero and Raffo families by seeking help from other families. 
 In 1990s, Backus started to consolidate its position in the market by acquiring 
its competitors.  First, Backus acquired CNC and obtained 65% of the national market 
in 199412.  In 1996, Backus established UCPBJ merging Backus, CNC and its two 
subsidiaries.  In 2000, UCPBJ finally acquired most shares of Cervesur, another rival 
brewery that had strong presence in the southern part of the country.  Today, there are 
three brewing companies in Peru, UCPBJ, Cervesur and Cervecería San Juan, all of 
which belong to Backus group. 
 
3-3-2. Control over Ownership and Management 
 The control of ownership (Chart 6) and management (Table 5) as of year 2000 
is studied in this paper.  From the observation on these data, some differences with 
Romero and Brescia groups can be pointed out.  First, important shares of the core 
company of the group, UCPBJ, are held by Minsur, Brescia’s mining company, and 
Pacífico Peruano Suiza, Romero’s insurance company.  Although Bentín family does 
not appear as a major share holder in the CONASEV’s record, some news reports 
revealed that Bentín family owned 30% while Bresica and Romero had 22% and 12% 
respectively13.  Second, UCPBJ owns most part of shares of the group companies.  
There is no sub-groups within the family business groups that were discussed in 
Romero and Brescia.  Third, there is more participation of other families in the board.  
These facts show that the control of Bentín family over ownership and management of 
the group companies is not as strong as that of Romero and Brescia over their groups. 
 Two factors might be affecting the control of Bentín family over Backus group.  
The first is that the shares of Backus were widely held among a large number of family 
members.  Although the history of Backus as a family business is not very long, for 
about a half century after Ricardo Bentín Sanchez assumed the presidency of the 
                                                  
12 Lanatta Piaggio, who controlled CNC, needed cash to rebuild the group’s food 
company, Molitalia.  However, the family later sold Molitalia to a Chilean company, 
and its family business disappeared. 
13 Reports from agenciaperu and Caretas. 
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company, Bentín family itself is a very eminent family with large family members.  
After the sales of shares to other families by some Bentín family members in the 1980s, 
there were still 15 shareholders with Bentín family name in 1987.  Furthermore, unlike 
Brescia’s investment and real estate development companies, which serve as family’s 
holding company, Bentín did not have any means to concentrate and coordinate family’s 
shares.   
 The second reason of Bentín’s weak control over the group is that the family 
itself did not start brewing business.  In case of Romero and Bresica, they started their 
own business and invested their profit in order to expand in size and scope.  However, 
in case of Bentín, they gained the control of Backus by acquiring relatively large shares 
of the brewery.  There was no exclusive control over ownership or management by 
Bentín family from the beginning. 
 
3-3-3. Sales to Foreign Capitals 
 Brewing companies in other Latin American countries have found potential in 
Peruvian market due to relatively low consumption of beer per capita.  Since the end 
of the 1990s, they became interested in acquiring B&J.  Upon being offered high 
prices by foreign capitals, minor shareholding families like Brescia, Romero and Raffo 
sold their shares.  Finally in 2002, Bavaria, a Colombian brewing company, obtained 
majority of UCPBJ’s shares.  Although Bentín family still holds 12% of stocks and 
their family members serve as the vice-president of the board and the general manager, 
it can no longer be called as Bentín’s family business.   
 
4. Family Control over Group Companies 
 
4-1. Three Sub-groups in Family Business 
 The above analysis shows that companies in a same family business group can 
be classified into three sub-groups according to characteristics of family’s control over 
ownership and management: (1) companies with exclusive control over both ownership 
and management by a family (EXCLUSIVE); (2) companies with a strong control by a 
family, but not exclusive (MAJOR); (3) companies in which control is shared with other 
families or foreign capitals (JOINT). 
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 Companies such as Ransa Comerical, Romero Trading in Romero family and 
Inversiones Breca in Brescia family can be classified as the EXCLUSIVE sub-group.  
In this sub-group, family members, including females, directly own shares of group 
companies.  At the same time, family members are board members, and often serve as 
managers.  These companies belong to industries like agriculture and commerce as in 
Romero, and real estate development as in Brescia, with which the families built the 
base of their business.  In these industries, family businesses have an advantage of 
owning large farm lands and distribution networks all over the country.  The amount of 
capitals necessary for the development of these industries is not very large, and families 
can finance by themselves.  Besides, family members themselves have knowledge and 
know how of the business.   
 Companies that belong to MAJOR sub-group are Alicorp of Romero, Minsur, 
Rimac and Exsa of Brescia.  Judging from composition of shareholders and board 
members, one family seems to have majority shares of these companies with the 
participation of other families.  The leading families secure the posts of the president 
and some directors, but other families also participate in the board, sometimes 
exercising influence with their expertise and experience in the industry.  While 
directors make important decisions of the companies, day-to-day management is left for 
professional salaried managers who do not belong to the families.  Sometimes, 
younger family members participate in the management of the companies as managers.   
This can be considered as trainings for younger members of the family.  Through the 
expansion into the manufacturing sector for the national market such as production of 
wheat flour based food industry, beverage, toiletry products, chemical products, etc., the 
family business becomes known to the national level.  In these sectors, foreign capitals 
have been competing with family businesses since before the liberalization of economy 
in the 1990s.  It is important to seek human, financial and technical resources from 
outside of the family for the success in these sectors.   
 Finally, companies that belong to JOINT sub-group are Banco de Crédito, El 
Pacífico Peruano Suiza (insurance) for Romero and Banco Continental and AFP 
Horizonte for Brescia, and brewery Backus for Bentín family.  The leading family 
often does not own majority shares, though, with help from other collaborating families, 
the leading family stays in posts of the president and some directors.  The family 
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control over ownership and management of companies in this sub-group is not as strong 
as that in other sub-groups.  Professional paid managers with higher education and rich 
experience are involved not only in day-to-day decision making but also in strategic 
decision of the companies.  Companies belong to JOINT sub-group are seen in 
financial sector such as banking, insurance, pension funds, and large scale mining 
projects, in which speed of technological innovation and management is very fast, and 
companies are competing across boarders due to the liberalization of economy.  Beer 
industry, which is now facing regional integration, is also included in this sub-group.  
It is indispensable for a family in order to obtain huge capital and highly educated and 
experienced human resources. 
  
4-2. Controlling Three Sub-groups 
 As mentioned above, companies that belong to family businesses in Peru can 
be classified into three sub-groups according to their control over ownership and 
management: EXCLUSIVE, MAJOR and JOINT.  The families first started their 
businesses with EXCLUSIVE companies.  Then, with MAJOR companies, they 
expand their scale and scope of the family businesses.  In the process of the economic 
liberalization after the 1990s in which higher competitiveness is required for survival, 
family businesses sought their business partners abroad and incorporated JOINT 
companies in order to obtain resources.  In other words, the evolution of a joint stock 
company and separation of ownership and management argued by Chandler did not 
happen in many family business companies in Peru.  The families, while keeping 
exclusive control of ownership and management over their traditional businesses of 
EXCLUSIVE companies in order to protect family assets, they combine different kinds 
of companies such as MAJOR and JOINT depending on business environment in order 
to expand socio economic influence of the family.  In the case they face with adverse 
business environment, they can sell MAJOR and JOINT companies while surviving 
with EXCLUSIVE companies, such as in the case of Brescia, which sold Tejidos La 
Unión at the beginning of the 1990s, and wait for another opportunity. 
 Among three sub-groups, JOINT companies, in which control is shared with 
other families or foreign capitals, have played important roles in the history of family 
business in Peru.  Families that have some kind of connection, for example, securing 
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posts in the board of the same bank, often collaborates each other in their businesses, 
making possible to raise capitals and share risks.  For example, when two breweries, 
Backus and CNC owned their shares each other, Bentín and Piaggio families together 
established a company that provides materials for both companies in order to reduce the 
production cost.  Also, Romero and Raffo, both of which have been in the board of 
Banco de Crédito, are partners in insurance, textile and urban development businesses.  
JOINT companies have helped families to build and expand the network among them. 
 In addition, JOINT companies have a mechanism to prevent failure through 
mutual monitoring among participating families.  In the case that a family that takes 
the lead in managing the company cannot satisfy other participating families, they try to 
take over the control of management by acquiring shares from other minority 
shareholders.  Romero, together with other Peruvian families, gained the control of 
Banco de Crédito at the end of the 1970s from the hands of the Italian bank.  Also, at 
the beginning of the 1980s when Brescia tried but failed to gain the control of Banco de 
Lima, which was controlled by Olaechea family, this attempt put pressure on the leading 
family to improve management of the business.  Furthermore, JOINT companies, 
which have been based on collaborations among Peruvian families, are established 
during the 1990s with foreign capitals in order to obtain financial, human and technical 
resources that cannot be obtained inside the country.   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 By focusing on the control over ownership and management, this paper 
attempts to analyze how family businesses in Peru have expanded their scale and scope,  
and are trying to survive after the liberalization of the economy.  The word “Family 
Business” often makes us think of a typical family business in which family exclusively 
controls both ownership and management of their group companies, also in which 
family members are shareholders, directors and managers.  However, as can be 
observed through the case studies, there are different kind of companies in Peru’s family 
businesses.  First, the families started their business in commerce, real estate, 
agricultural export, etc.  These enterprises became the bases of their family business, 
and the families keep exclusive control on both ownership and management.  Second, 
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during the period of industrialization by import substitution, the families expanded scale 
and scope of their businesses through purchasing enterprises from foreign capitals that 
withdrew from the country.  In these businesses, the families control majority of 
ownership and management, but they accept capitals and directors from other families 
in order to share risks and supplement resources.  Third, during the market economy 
reform in the 1990s, the families actively made alliances with other families and foreign 
capitals in order to obtain financial, human and technical resources that could not be 
obtained within the families.  Although the leading families do not have absolute 
control over the ownership of the companies, they keep control over management 
through collaboration with other participating families.  This is how family businesses 
in Peru maintain themselves today. 
 The business environment surrounding Peru’s family businesses is getting more 
competitive due to the liberalization of the economy during the 1990s.  In the 
privatization process, only foreign capitals participated in industries that requires great 
amount of capital, such as petroleum and telecommunications.  No Peruvian family 
business was able to participate in it.  Even though in the industries in which family 
businesses are considered to have advantages over foreign capitals, such as beer 
industry in which loyalty to brands and distribution channels play important roles, 
Peruvian families cannot compete with foreign capitals that have enough financial 
resources to acquire a whole company, as in the case of acquisition of Backus. 
 The sales of Backus also raised an important issue on survival of family 
business.  One of the reasons of the acquisition by a foreign capital is that shares of the 
company were widely held among Bentín family, and some family members sold their 
shares for their individual interest, rather than the family interest.  Bentín is a 
distinguished family with a large number of family members, and the spread of 
ownership within the family was wider than others.  There was no mechanism to 
coordinate the interest of the Bentín family as a whole, such as family holding company 
or family trust, which can be seen in other Latin American family businesses.  This 
was the reason why the family finally lost its control.  Toward the future expansion of 
family business in Peru, this case suggests that the families need to introduce some 
mechanism to coordinate family interest such as family council, family holding 
company, etc. 
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Chart 1 Romero family 
Dionisio 
 
 
(Source)  Elaborated by author 
Calixto Santo 
Romero Hernandez 
Founder 
Dionisio 
Romero Iturrospe 
Romero Seminario 
Third generation, 
chairperson of Credicorp 
MBA Stanford Univ. 
Calixto 
Romero Seminario 
Chairperson of PPS 
Manuel 
Romero Seminario 
Rufina 
Romero Seminario 
Dionisio 
Romero Paoletti 
Fourth generation, 
chairperson of Alicorp 
MBA Stanford Univ. 
 
Francisca 
Romero Iturrospe 
Jose Antonio 
Onrubia Romero Jose Antonio 
Onrubia Holder 
Substitute director of Alicorp 
MBA Babson College María del Carmen 
Onrubia Romero 
 
Beeck 
Manuel 
Romero Belismelis 
Substitute director of Alicorp 
Luis Enrique 
Romero Belismelis 
Substitute director of Alicorp 
Boston Univ. 
Feliciano 
Del Campo Romero 
Second generation 
 
Onrubia 
Javier 
Beeck Onrubia 
Director of Alicorp 
MBA Northwestern Univ. 
Calixto 
Romero Guzman 
Director of Alicorp 
Ernest 
Romero Belismelis 
Vice chairperson of Alicorp 
Babson College 
Rosalina 
Helguero Romero 
Fernando 
Romero Belismelis 
General manager of Romero Trading 
Rosa Fejioo 
first and middle names 
legend 
family names (paternal & maternal) 
position in a group company 
education 
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Char 2-1 Investment in Credicorp group companies (as of 2001 and investment in Credicorp as of 2002. Figures show percentage of company's shares owned by 
each investor.) 
 
 
(Source) elaborated by author based on information from CONASEV (www.conasev.gob.pe, January 2004) and From 20F of Securities and Exchange Commision 
of U.S.A. 
CREDICOPR 
holdings 
(Bermudas) 
ATLANTIC 
SECURITY 
HOLDING 
CORP 
holding company 
(U.S.A.) 
ATLANTIC 
SECURITY 
BANK 
(U.S.A.) 
BANCO DE 
CREDITO DEL 
PERU 
bank 
 
SOLUCION 
FINANCIERA 
personal loan 
Romero Family 
 
AFP  
Integra 
(institutional 
investor) 
AFP  
Horizonte 
(institutional 
investor) 
 
PACIFICO 
PERUANO 
SUIZA 
insurance 
PACIFICO 
VIDA 
life 
insurance 
AMERICAN 
INTERNATIONAL 
UNDERWRITERS 
OVERSEAS LTD.  
(U.S.A.) 
AFP  
Union Vida 
(institutional 
investor) 
 
AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE 
COMPANY 
(U.S.A.) 
100 
100 
96.22 
10.76 
100 
15.57 
11.60 
10.47 
9.46 
75.72 
20.01 
38 
62 
Capital Group 
International, Inc. 
AFP  
Profuturo 
(institutional 
investor) 
 
5.43 
7.19 
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Chart 2-2 Investment in Alicorp and Ransa groups (as of 2001, Figures show percentage of company's shares owned by each investors)  
FAMILIA ROMERO 
+ MARY S.A. (family owned) 
 
(Source)  Elaborated by author based on information from CONASEV (www.conasev.gob.pe, January 2004).
Alicorp Group 
RANSA 
COMERCIAL 
logistics 
PACIFICO 
PERUANO 
SUIZA 
insurance 
CIA 
UNIVERSAL 
TEXTIL 
textile 
 
CIA 
ALMACENERA 
SUR 
warehouse 
 
INDUSTRIA 
TEXTIL PIURA 
textile 
ROMERO 
TRADING 
trading 
INDUSTRIA 
DE ESPINO 
production of oil 
and fat 
PALMA DE ESPINO 
agriculture 
ALICORP 
foods and toiletry 
CARGIL 
AMERICAS INC 
(U.S.A.) 
HO 
CARTDAM 
(institutional 
investor) 
BIRMINGHAM 
MERCHANT S.A. 
(Panama) 
NUEVA VIDA 
CARTADM 
(institutional 
investor) 
100   
  
100 55.98
8.17 
7.01 
5.05 
6.56 
13.56 
17.97 
7.79 
98.96 
12.97 5.23
99.8 
26.48 
10.23 
Ransa Group 
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Chart 3 Brescia family 
Pedro Francisco 
 
 
(Source)  Elaborated by author 
Fortunato 
Brescia 
founder 
Brescia Cafferata 
second generation, chairperson of 
Banco Continental 
Mario Augusto 
Brescia Cafferata 
vice chairperson of Banco Continental 
 
Moreyra 
Rosa 
Brescia Cafferata 
director of Inversiones Breca 
Pedro Manuel Juan  
Brescia Moreyra 
director of Banco Continental 
Fortunato Juan José  
Brescia Moreyra 
substitute director of Banco 
Continental 
Mario Augusto Miguel  
Brescia Moreyra 
substitute director of Banco 
Continental 
Catalina 
Cafferata Peñaranda 
Ana María Rosa 
Brescia Cafferata 
Alex Paul Gastón  
Fort Brescia Paul  
Fort Magot director of Banco Continental 
MBA 
 
first and middle names 
legend 
family names (paternal & maternal) 
position in group company 
education 
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Chart 4 Investment in Brescia group companies (as of 1998 to 2000, Figures show percentage of company's shares owned by each investor.) 
Familia Brescia 
 
(Source)  Elaborated by author based on information from CONASEV (www.conasev.gob.pe, January 2004). 
 
Minsur 
mining 
Holding Continental 
holdings 
Banco 
Continental 
bank 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria 
(Spain) 
RIMAC 
insurance 
Explosivos 
chemical 
13.52 
24.85 
54.36 
13.82 
91.97 
32.31 
Inversiones San 
Borja 
holding company 
98.74 
AFP 
Horizonte 
pension fund 
Inversiones 
Nacionales de 
Turismo 
tourism 
100 100 
11.71 
16.83 
Urbannización 
Santa Marina 
holding company 
100 
85.76 
Urbanniza
Jardín 
ción 
holdings 
13.33 
10.34 
20.88 Juan Miranda 
Costa 
family owned 
Ralli 
Brothers 
Limited  
(U.K.) 
15.87 
Bolsa 
securities 
50 
20.97 
11.14 
4.37 
Titulalizadora 
securities 
Administrador de 
Fondos 
fund management 
100 
100  100
16.98 
11.74 
6.47 
20.73 
15.15 
Inversiones Breca 
holdings 
5.29 
Corporación 
General 
Financiera 
(Spain) 
 
Provida 
Internacional 
(Chile) 
 
4.91 
14.51 
Family holding 
group 
Business group 
Financial group 
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Chart 5 Bentín family 
César 
Bentín Vicor 
 
(Source)  Elaborated by author
Carlos María 
Bentín 
Manuela Martín 
La Fuente y La 
Palomera 
Antonio 
Bentín 
y La Fuente 
ex premier 
 
Ricardo 
Bentín Sánchez 
ex vice-chairperson of 
Congress 
Rosa 
Mujica Carassa 
Arturo 
Bentín 
Herpan 
Bentín Sánchez 
Adán 
Bentín 
Elías 
Mujica y 
Trasmonte 
ex  director of 
CNC 
Manuel 
Mujica 
Montri Alfaro 
ex vice chairperson of 
UCPBJ, attorney 
Carlos 
Mujica Carassa 
ex chairperson of CNC 
Ricardo David 
Bentín Mujica 
ex chairerson of 
B&J 
Luis Felipe 
Bentín Mujica 
ex director of B&J 
and general 
manager of CNC 
Antonio Narciso 
Bentín Mujica 
founder of airline 
Elías 
Bentín Mujica 
Rosa 
Bentín Mujica 
Pedro Carlos 
Bentín Mujica 
José Luis 
Bentín Mujica 
María Manuela 
Bentín Mujica 
Carlos Felipe 
Bentín Remy 
general manager of 
UCPBJ 
Jorge 
Bentín Remy 
ex director of UCPBJ 
and chairperson of 
Novasalud, surgeon 
Rosario 
Bentín Remy 
de Noriega 
Elías 
Bentín Peral 
ex general manager and 
chairperson of UCPBJ 
Catalina 
Bentín Grande 
ex director of UCPBJ 
Luis 
Bentín Remy 
ex director of Condor 
Insurance 
Ricardo 
Bentín Grande 
ex director of Del Mar 
first and middle names 
legend 
family names (paternal & maternal) 
position in group company 
education 
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Chart 6 Backus group companies (as of 2000, Figures show percentage of company's shares owned by each investor.) 
Minsur 
mining of 
Bresica family 
Pacifico Peruano 
Suiza 
insurance of 
Romero family 
Cía. de 
Inversiones 
Comerciales 
Odracir Esmeralda 
holdings Holding Ltd. 
(Virgin Island) 
holdings 
 
* Shares owned by families are 30% by Bentín, 22% by Brescia and 12% by Romero. 
(Source)  Elaborated by author based on the annual report of each company obtained from CONASEV. 
 
98 
Backus（UCPBJ）* 
brewery and 
holdings 
Cervesur 
brewery 
13.98 
7.89  
100  10.65 100  
6.19  
50 
72.6 
Cervecería 
San Juan 
brewery 
81 
99.99 
Novasalud 
medical service 
100  94 99 
Creditex 
textile 
Alimentos 
Procesados 
food process 
Amarante 
Investment 
Holding company 
(Netherlands 
Antilles Aruba) 
8.8 12.1 
50 
Wiese Aetna 
Seguro de Vida 
life insurance of 
ING of Holland 
Corporación 
Backus y 
Johnston 
Holding company 
98 
100 100 
Agroindustrias 
Backus 
agroindustry 
Agua Mineral 
San Mateo 
beverage 
Transporte 77 
transport 
100 
Industrial de 
Envase 
manufacturing 
Inmobiliaria 
Pariach 
real estate 
Malteria Lima 
manufacturing 
Quipudata 
100 
data processing 
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